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CHINA’S AIRCR AFT C ARRIER PROGR AM
Drivers, Developments, Implications
Andrew Scobell, Michael McMahon, and Cortez A. Cooper III

O

ne of the most eye-catching episodes in China’s defense buildup was the 25
September 2012 commissioning of Beijing’s first aircraft carrier. The sixtyfive-thousand-ton Liaoning was launched with much fanfare, presided over by
the president of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), then Hu Jintao, as well as
by the vice president and Hu’s political successor, Xi Jinping. The commissioning
of Liaoning underscored both the remarkable advances in the PRC’s shipbuilding in recent decades and the significant limitations that remain. The vessel
immediately became the largest in the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).
Originally launched in 1988 for the Soviet navy, the carrier, at that point known
as Varyag and lying incomplete in a Ukrainian yard, had been purchased by a
Chinese shell company in 1998 and towed to China three years later. The vessel
was fully refurbished in a Chinese shipyard, and an extensive array of systems was
installed. Liaoning is considered a medium-sized carrier that can accommodate
a combination of approximately thirty-six fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft,
with a crew of at least one thousand.
One Chinese security analyst proclaimed the eventual relaunch was on a par in
“strategic significance” (zhanlue yiyi) with China’s earlier acquisition of the “two
bombs [nuclear and hydrogen] and one satellite” (liang dan, yi xing), in the sense
that the commissioning of Liaoning signaled China’s entry into an exclusive club
of great powers. But other naval analysts sought to downplay the event. Retired
PLAN admiral Yin Zhuo stressed that the commissioning of the Liaoning was
only a first step: China, he observed, was very much a “rookie” (xinshou) at operating this highly “complex technical system,” while “other countries” (i.e., the
United States) had more than a century of experience.1 No matter how modest
the beginnings, however, there are strong indications that China has ambitious
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plans: Liaoning is likely to be the first of as many as five carriers that the PLAN
intends to put into service in the coming years.
Some observers discern the emergence of a naval arms race in the AsiaPacific.2 But however military trends in the region are best characterized, it is
clear that countries such as China and India are energetically expanding their
navies. Without a doubt, carrier expansion in the early twenty-first century
will be concentrated in Asia. Beijing and New Delhi each appear committed to
commissioning multiple aircraft carriers in the near future. In addition to China
and India, Japan commissioned a helicopter-carrying destroyer capable of being
reconfigured to handle short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing aircraft. No decision,
by Beijing or any other capital, to pursue such an involved program can be taken
lightly, because it requires a massive commitment of resources and extended time
horizons. An aircraft carrier is an expensive and complex system of systems. Carrier programs require sustained effort, substantial funding streams, and considerable technical and professional competence. Carriers are a luxury few countries
can afford. Even fewer countries have the shipyards, engineering expertise, and
associated infrastructure to build these vessels.
It is ironic that the country that has done more than any other to move aircraft
carriers closer to obsolescence through advances in military technology has invested in its own aircraft carrier program. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA),
for example, has acquired highly accurate antiship ballistic missiles—“carrier
killers.” What is driving China’s carrier ambitions, and what is the likely future
trajectory of its carrier program? What new operational capabilities does a carrier
provide the PLAN? How does the arrival of China’s carrier affect the security situation in the Asia-Pacific? What are the implications of Chinese aircraft carriers
for the United States?
We examine first the drivers, the operational capabilities, and then we consider the future trajectory of China’s carrier program. Last, we evaluate the implications of the carrier program for the balance of maritime power in the western
Pacific and beyond.
DRIVERS OVER THE DECADES
China’s entry into the exclusive aircraft-carrier club played out over several decades in a slow-motion series of low-key and secretive developments, in a pattern
that prompts a range of competing explanations about the drivers of the initiative.
The earliest explanation posited for driving China’s maritime ambitions was
that of bureaucratic interests. These interests were initially identified with the
South China Sea and have been advanced collectively as the key driver for the
PRC’s aircraft carrier program.3 The emergence of an actual program suggested
the growing influence of the PLAN in the armed forces. The navy’s second-rate
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss4/7
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status within the PLA was and is changing. Since 2004, for example, the commander of Beijing’s navy has had a seat on the Central Military Commission
(CMC)—the apex of military power in the PRC, a body roughly equivalent to
the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Nevertheless, and while the maritime service has
enjoyed an unprecedented rate of modernization in recent decades, the dominant
service in the PLA continues to be the ground force.4 Moreover, as will be seen,
the program’s key champion appears to have been an individual rather than a
bureaucracy.
A second explanation is that the PRC’s carrier program is driven primarily by
nationalism.5 Clearly China’s carrier program has strong public support; there is
considerable pride in the country’s first aircraft carrier. A wave of aircraft carrier
euphoria—or a “Hangmu style” craze—swept the country as people imitated the
pose of two flight-deck crewmen shown in a publicity photo guiding a J-15 fighter as it made a historic shipboard landing on Liaoning in November 2012. Most
Chinese would agree with Major General Zhang Shiping’s insistence that “for
China to become a major world power without an aircraft carrier is completely
unthinkable.” The general, an Academy of Military Sciences researcher, insisted
that “acquiring a carrier was an historical necessity” for China.6
Possession of multiple carriers epitomizes the overwhelming naval dominance
of the United States, and their lack emphasizes the continued weakness of China’s
navy. One of the most jarring moments for China in post–Cold War East Asia
occurred when in early 1996 the United States dispatched two aircraft-carrier
strike groups in response to Chinese saber rattling in the Taiwan Strait. For Beijing, the act harked back to the nineteenth century, when China had been bullied
first by Western powers and then by Japan and forced to sign “unequal treaties”
trampling on national sovereignty and to concede territory. For the Chinese, U.S.
aircraft carrier dominance represents a latter-day variant of gunboat diplomacy
and underscores that China, despite greatly increased military might, continues
to be inferior, impotent in the face of overwhelming U.S. naval power.
A third possible driver of China’s carrier program is an evolving overarching
strategic logic or coherent maritime strategy.7 According to this interpretation,
the PRC is pursuing a grand strategic vision—widely attributed to Admiral Liu
Huaqing (1916–2011) and first set out in the early 1980s—by which the PLAN
would gradually extend its reach outward into the Pacific Ocean in a phased expansion of Chinese seapower. In the first phase, by 2000, the PLAN was to extend
its area of operations in the “near seas” (the South China Sea, East China Sea,
and Yellow Sea) out as far as the so-called First Island Chain—the Kuril Islands,
Japan, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, the Philippines, Borneo, and Natuna Besar. In the
second phase, by 2020, the PLAN aimed to project its operational reach out to
the so-called Second Island Chain—the Bonins, the Marianas, and the Carolines.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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In the third phase, by 2050, China would become a global seapower, and its navy
would hence operate on a par with the U.S. Navy. In fact, the PLAN’s activities
and power-projection efforts have so far kept pace with this timeline.
This road map for the development of China’s seapower grew in significance
as China’s economy underwent rapid growth and its seaborne trade experienced
major expansion during the 1980s and 1990s. China’s maritime strategy gained
greater traction in the twenty-first century as the PRC perceived itself as being
under growing threat from the United States. Particularly since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Beijing has viewed Washington’s behavior around
its periphery as aimed at containing or encircling the PRC.8 From the Chinese
perspective, the United States has become increasingly assertive in the near seas,
especially in the South China Sea.
We suggest that an evolving overarching strategic logic has propelled the
PRC’s carrier program inexorably forward. This analysis of the historical record
suggests that while nationalism was certainly an important contextual factor
and lobbying by PLAN leaders was significant in keeping the idea of a carrier
program alive, ultimately the decisive driver was strategic logic and operational
importance. Indeed, the program’s lengthy gestation and its repeated failure early
on to gain traction are attributable to the absence of a strategic imperative until
quite recently. The emergence of this strategic imperative and the operational
demands for a carrier in the twenty-first century correspond to the emergence of
PLA and PLAN thinking and planning beyond a Taiwan scenario.9
GENESIS OF CHINA’S CARRIER PROGRAM
China’s carrier program has evolved remarkably over five decades. In the span of
forty years the program was transformed from one man’s elusive dream in 1970
to the acquisition and refurbishment of a Soviet-era carrier to the actual commissioning of an aircraft carrier in 2012.
The 1970s: One Man’s Dream
China’s aircraft carrier program languished for many years, for lack of a strategic
imperative. But the idea of an aircraft carrier never died completely, because
of the persistence of a key PLAN leader, Liu Huaqing, who gradually rose to
the highest post in the military hierarchy, assuming the vice-chairmanship of
the CMC in 1989. The origins of the PLAN’s aircraft carrier program are intimately intertwined with the career of this prominent military figure. Justifiably
considered the most important and certainly the most dogged champion of the
program, Liu is often dubbed the “father of China’s aircraft carrier,” as well as
“China’s Mahan.”10 Irrespective of these labels, Liu certainly qualifies as the most
influential military figure in post–Mao Zedong, reform-era China. Significantly,
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Liu was the last uniformed member of the all-powerful Chinese Communist
Party’s Politburo Standing Committee, a seat he relinquished in 1997.
According to his memoirs, as early as 1970 Liu floated to his military superiors a proposal that China begin preparations to acquire an aircraft carrier. His
suggestion does not appear to have received any support within the PLA hierarchy.11 This is hardly surprising, since the PRC had nothing remotely resembling
a blue-water navy in the 1970s; its main threat at the time was overland invasion or attack by the Soviet army, an attack that could come anywhere along the
several-thousand-mile and very exposed common land border. Neither does the
most logical maritime scenario—an attack on or invasion of Taiwan—appear to
have received any serious attention at the time. Thus, there was no compelling
strategic or operational rationale for the development of a PLAN carrier program
in the 1970s, and nationalism did not even come into play.
The 1980s: A Vision
In the decade following Mao Zedong’s death, the idea of an aircraft carrier
seemed a more plausible, if still remote, possibility. While the PRC’s primary
military threat remained land-centric—the Soviet army—the “reform and opening” policy of Deng Xiaoping significantly altered its national security calculus
and defense priorities. As the PRC embraced foreign investment and expanded
international trade, Beijing began to attach much greater weight to maritime
matters. PRC leaders had to be concerned not only with the security of their land
borders but also with coastal waters and beyond—that is, both the “near shore”
or littoral (jinan) and the “near seas” (jinhai).12 Moreover, territorial claims in the
South China Sea and the unresolved matter of Taiwan provided added impetus
for modernizing the PLAN. In the mid-1980s, the PLA shifted its preparations
from imminent all-out global conflagration likely involving nuclear and conventional conflict between China and one of the superpowers to limited, localized,
conventional war-fighting scenarios.
The geostrategic reorientation and doctrinal transformation produced a new
strategic logic that was more conducive to the idea of aircraft carriers. Liu recalls
in his memoirs that in November 1986 he chaired a seminar comprising military
and civilian leaders and experts: “Many comrades expressed the view that from
the standpoint of our strategic mission of safeguarding the country’s maritime
interests, including the recovery of the Nansha [Islands], and the reunification of
Taiwan, the navy should develop aircraft carriers. My own thinking was consistent with this view.”13
The purchase in 1985 of the decommissioned Australian navy carrier Melbourne by a PRC company, ostensibly for scrap, signaled Beijing’s growing
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interest in a carrier program. The vessel was reportedly scrutinized by Chinese
engineers and naval architects, and the flight deck was kept intact when the rest
of the ship was scrapped. In 1982, upon being promoted to commander of the
PLAN, Liu commissioned a research institute in Shanghai to conduct a study on
the feasibility of carriers. Three years later Liu directed the Guangzhou Naval
Academy to initiate a training course for aircraft carrier commanders.14
1990s: A Serious Debate
By the mid-1990s, maritime challenges had moved to the front and center of
Beijing’s national security concerns. The Soviet breakup had created three new
neighbors in Central Asia, but Beijing moved swiftly and deftly to recognize these
states, resolve territorial disputes, and demilitarize border areas. It could then
focus greater attention on the security of coastal regions and on unresolved maritime territorial disputes. The increasing importance of the near seas and China’s
growing dependence on the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) radiating out
beyond the First Island Chain were highlighted by tensions in the South China
Sea (in 1995), a crisis in the Taiwan Strait (1995–96), and by China’s becoming
(in 1993) a net importer of petroleum, most of it by sea from the Middle East
and Africa.
Within a three-year span, Chinese entities bought three Soviet-era aircraft
carriers: Minsk and Varyag (both in 1998) and Kiev (in May 2000). These buys
represented a sizable expenditure—reportedly totaling some U.S.$33.4 million
—and thus a degree of high-level coordination. Moreover, the circumstances
surrounding these purchases were suspicious, in terms of their announced purposes. For example, the buyer of Varyag, the Chong Lot Tourist and Amusement
Agency, reportedly had several retired PLAN officers on its board of directors.
The supposed intent of the company was to turn Varyag into a floating casino
in the gambling mecca of Macau, but the waters around the former Portuguese
colony are too shallow to accommodate the vessel, and no application for a gambling permit appears to have been filed. When in early 2002 Varyag arrived in
China, it docked well away from Macau, in the northern port of Dalian.
This flurry of activity suggests that Beijing was engaged in a major debate
about the viability of acquiring an aircraft carrier. The option being most seriously considered was to complete a carrier indigenously on one of the hulls
purchased overseas, rather than buying a completely fitted, foreign-made carrier.
During the mid-1990s Chinese entities reportedly made a considerable effort to
acquire blueprints for an aircraft carrier from a Spanish shipbuilder that was constructing one for the Royal Thai Navy, showing far less interest in placing such an
order themselves.15 By the end of the decade, CMC chair Jiang Zemin had reportedly given the PLAN the green light to commence work on designing a carrier.16
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2000s: A Decision Is Made
With the dawn of a new century, the maritime domain loomed ever larger for
Beijing in strategic significance. The result, according to an authoritative overview of PLAN history, was a “paradigmatic change” (zhuanxing) in naval thinking from the near seas to the “far seas” (yuanhai).17 PRC aircraft and surface and
subsurface vessels routinely found themselves operating in the same vicinity as
U.S. platforms, often at very close quarters. These encounters prompted a growing number of incidents. Of particular note was an April 2001 episode in which
a PLAN J-8 fighter collided with a U.S. Navy EP-3 surveillance aircraft some
seventy-five nautical miles south of Hainan Island. To Beijing, the event signaled
a growing, perceived threat of U.S. strategic encirclement and the emergence of
the near seas as a hot zone of U.S.-Chinese contestation.
The decision to go ahead with the construction of an aircraft carrier was reportedly made by the CMC in 2004 or 2005;18 the decision was almost certainly
made in conjunction with CMC chairman Hu Jintao’s December 2004 announcement of revised military strategic guidelines (junshi zhanlue fangzhen) for the
PLA. These guidelines function as a “rolling national military strategy” that
provides the key guidance and direction for planning and force development.19
Addressing the CMC on 24 December 2004, Hu outlined what became known
as the “New Historic Missions,” representing an important modification of strategic guidelines issued in 1993. Two of the broad-brush missions he sketched for
the PLA were protecting China’s “national interests” and safeguarding “world
peace.”20 The former mission has since been defined ever more expansively to
include China’s maritime territorial claims inside the First Island Chain and its
“overseas interests” well beyond. The latter mission provides the rationale for
a greater global role for the PLAN in a broad spectrum of activities, including
patrolling the SLOCs and contributing to international humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief.21 Reportedly, Hu subsequently endorsed the concept of “far
sea operations” (yuanhai zuozhan). Together these developments put in place the
strategic and doctrinal logic for naval force modernization in general and for, by
extension, the acquisition of several aircraft carriers.
Extensive work was under way throughout the middle of the first decade of the
twenty-first century in a Dalian shipyard to complete Varyag as an operational
aircraft carrier. But no official public statement was forthcoming; the PRC was
equipping a major naval surface combatant but keeping mum about the matter.
Noteworthy was the absence of any mention of the PLAN’s carrier project in
China’s defense white papers of 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010. However, in 2006
and 2007 several senior military officials did publicly comment that the PRC
had decided to develop an aircraft carrier program, with the goal of indigenously
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building them. Finally, in March 2009, the PRC minister of national defense,
General Liang Guanglie, declared that the PLAN was preparing to build its own
aircraft carriers.22
2010s: Commissioning a Carrier
In the second decade of the century tensions emerged with the United States and
China’s neighbors in the near seas that seemed only to underscore the growing
importance of seapower to the PRC. In 2010 China accused the United States of
meddling in the South China Sea and then heatedly protested a planned U.S.–
South Korean joint military exercise scheduled for the Yellow Sea. Tensions also
rose in the East China Sea over the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Beijing
claims a two-hundred-mile exclusive economic zone in all these areas and insists
that other countries cannot operate military vessels or aircraft there without
its prior approval. In November 2013, China announced the creation of an airdefense identification zone in the East China Sea. China also, looking beyond
its immediate maritime vicinity to the Indian Ocean, took note of developments
in India’s aircraft carrier program. In 2009 New Delhi had laid the keel of INS
Vikrant and proceeded with indigenous construction of carriers capable, like
Varyag, of operating high-performance tactical aircraft using a short-takeoff-butarrested-recovery (STOBAR) design.
The evolution of a strategic logic became more apparent: an aircraft carrier
was needed to cope with the PRC’s expanding array of maritime interests. It was
against this backdrop that Varyag underwent its first sea trial in August 2011. The
vessel cruised the Bohai Gulf and Yellow Sea for four days before returning to
port. Further sea trials followed. In late September 2012 ex-Varyag was officially
commissioned as Liaoning. The ship was ceremonially christened by Hu Jintao
barely two months before he stepped down as chair of the CMC. As a result, Hu
will go down in history as the leader responsible for China’s first operational aircraft carrier, even though experts contend that the carrier will not become fully
employable for several more years.
THE TRAJECTORY: A HYBRID NAVY
In the interim, the next three to five years, Liaoning will primarily serve as a training platform, operating mostly within the First and Second Island Chains. Most
PLAN ships have three-digit Arabic hull numbers; Liaoning’s two-digit number,
16, indicates its official rating as a training vessel.
While China now has a carrier with a sea-based tactical aviation capability,
time will be needed for its air wing to become operationally competent and for
the ship itself to conduct proficiency training with destroyers, frigates, and submarines (as Liaoning did in December 2013 for the first time, in the South China
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Sea). Perhaps the most useful benchmark for the operational readiness of Liao
ning is the level of training, equipment, and organization of its aviation component. Properly configuring Liaoning for carrier-group operations will take time,
but establishing the naval aviation component—fully functioning squadrons of
carrier-based aircraft—is likely to take much longer. Since its commissioning,
most of Liaoning’s at-sea time has been devoted to certification of shipboard
air-operations systems and to initial pilot training, using experienced pilots and
test aircraft. But China will not achieve a true aircraft-carrier capability until the
two elements—an organized and trained air component and a fully tested, fleetconfigured carrier—have been coupled. The passing of various signposts may
be evident on this path as they occur, one being the establishment of a tactical
aviation air wing. Incorporation of fully trained and organized, mission-capable,
fleet tactical air wings is not likely until 2018 or later.
Furthermore, to gauge the timeline for the commissioning of China’s second
carrier—expected to be indigenously designed and built—it makes sense to monitor the development of air component training and organization and also full
production of the J-15 aircraft, and perhaps as well the development of the J-31,
potentially China’s future, fifth-generation, sea-based tactical aircraft. Of course,
these timelines will run concurrently with the design of any indigenous aircraft
carrier. The challenge of balancing these two processes may explain the seeming
deliberateness of the PLAN’s pace in designing and commencing construction of
its next aircraft carrier.
Moreover, additional aircraft carriers, almost certainly in the cards, will probably come online gradually, over the course of the next two decades. The longer
a new, indigenously designed carrier is delayed, the more likely the design will
be to adopt a large-deck format and increased capabilities. Such a platform could
accommodate fifth-generation aircraft and incorporate leading technology, electronics, and design features. Also, the most modern computer-assisted-design
tools, construction practices, and facilities that China’s shipbuilding industry has
to offer would be available for the project. The large scope of the design work involved in the conversion (i.e., from the original Soviet “aircraft-carrying cruiser”
configuration) of Liaoning at the Dalian shipyard is likely to provide a “walking
start” for a more modern carrier.
The PLAN does not appear to be building a future force that has aircraft carriers at its core. Such a goal would require a complete order-of-battle overhaul.
There may have been a Chinese realization that the role of carrier-based aviation
would be limited in any potential large-scale conflict with the United States.
Instead, current doctrine and naval modernization suggest that while the PLAN
is aiming for at least three additional carriers, they would be focused on power
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projection—inside the island chains but also in the Indian Ocean, as well as
distant areas where overseas interests in resources are strong, such as Africa and
Latin America.23 Nevertheless, as Yin Zhuo observes, the introduction, for whatever purpose, of carriers demands a major change in PLAN thinking and requires
in the near term a modified “grouping format” of escort vessels with Liaoning at
the center.24 In short, China’s navy appears to have adopted a hybrid approach
encompassing both carrier and surface-action groups for mission-specific operations and the projection of influence.
In addition, such an approach comports with political and fiscal realities. Aircraft carriers are extremely expensive. Whether the hull is acquired from abroad
or built indigenously does not necessarily make much difference in overall
cost; both options are expensive, and follow-on carriers may not be appreciably
cheaper if they are of different designs or possess different subsystems. Moreover,
while the PLAN has increased its power and influence vis-à-vis the other services in the past decade or so, the ground force remains, as noted, the dominant
service and enjoys the preponderance of political clout. The navy must compete
with the People’s Liberation Army Air Force, which has greater representation
on the CMC—an unprecedented two seats are held by air force generals.25 While
the defense budget has been growing in double digits annually, overall military
spending is carefully monitored, and continued increases presume further economic growth. In short, the size of the defense budget and constraints on funds
allocated for PLAN acquisitions are limited.
The Operational Demands on Carriers
China’s growing oceanic interests expand the operational demands on the PLAN,
from defending disputed maritime claims to protecting China’s fishing and
merchant fleets.26 The aircraft carrier can provide much-needed air protection
for the surface ships and submarines operating several hundred miles out. The
most obvious region for such operations would be in the southern portions of the
South China Sea, some nine hundred miles from Hainan Island—well beyond the
routine patrol range of PLAN land-based aircraft. Indeed, it is in this area that Liu
Huaqing reportedly felt an aircraft carrier would prove its worth.27
The most pressing operational logic for aircraft carriers relates to the value
they add in wartime. PLA analysts who studied the Royal Navy’s performance
in the Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982 concluded that aircraft carriers played a
key role in the British victory over Argentina.28 Today, carriers offer the PLAN
extended blue-water capability—to the Second Island Chain and beyond—and
an improved capacity for antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and airborne early warning (AEW). The ASW and AEW missions require multiple carriers; however,
even one fully capable aircraft carrier could represent the PLA’s first steps toward
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extended air (i.e., offensive) and air-defense cover for regional contingencies and
an incremental extension of the air-defense umbrella in tandem with advanced
escort combatants. For the present, ASW and AEW vulnerabilities remain too
great to allow Liaoning to be successfully employed in high-intensity maritime
combat; its size and configuration preclude the launch of the larger aircraft that
would perform these missions. In short, as we have seen, there are limitations to
what Liaoning can do, especially with such limited operational experience.
What difference would one or two aircraft carriers make in a contingency inside the First Island Chain? In a South China Sea clash, Liaoning would provide
extra airpower projection against opposing combatants, especially in the southernmost reaches of that body of water; it would also present adversaries with a
“nice, big target.” One carrier or even two would offer little in an East China Sea
battle. As for a Taiwan contingency, carrier air would not contribute much in the
fight itself, although it might have utility as a diversion in more easily protected
zones away from Taiwan and Japan. Moreover, the use of an aircraft carrier would
severely complicate the PLA’s current doctrinal approach—missile-centric firepower strike and counterintervention operations, supported by advanced information warfare. This would be especially true in a Taiwan contingency.
The choice to retain the original, Soviet-era STOBAR design suggests that
Liaoning’s missions will be more limited than those of U.S. aircraft carriers. A
“ski jump” bow and the absence to date of catapults restrict the size and weight
of an aircraft that can take off from the deck (and accordingly the payload and
amount of fuel it can carry). Thus the onboard air wing will focus on air defense,
protecting the carrier and escort vessels at sea. Finally, Liaoning is conventionally
powered, which limits its range and necessitates regular refueling.
Noncombat Operations
Additional demands are represented by the contributions an aircraft carrier will
be expected to make to peacetime operations. Indeed, this noncombat dimension
has received considerable attention in recent years in China. Moreover, the PLA
neither has recent war-fighting experience nor anticipates significant combat
operations in the near future. Thus Liaoning and any subsequent aircraft carriers can expect considerable noncombat operational employment. Since at least
2008 China’s armed forces have emphasized military operations other than war
(MOOTW) as a doctrinal component. While MOOTW “with Chinese characteristics” has a significant domestic dimension, this body of doctrine also includes
substantial maritime and overseas elements, and the PLAN appears poised to
play a central role in it. Its MOOTW missions could include “flat deck” (i.e.,
large air-capable ship) operations in support of SLOC protection, humanitarian
assistance, and disaster relief. China became acutely aware of the usefulness of
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aircraft carriers during the U.S. Navy’s response to the Southeast Asian tsunami
in 2004. Furthermore, recent PLA experiences with noncombatant evacuations
in such places as Libya have highlighted the value of air and naval assets.
In peacetime, a carrier provides a high-profile presence wherever it steams.
It can symbolize power and commitment without necessarily raising alarm. But
the challenge for China in the not-too-distant future will be how to operate a
carrier close to home without being perceived as threatening by its neighbors. A
carrier is much more likely to be warmly welcomed outside the First and Second
Island Chains than within them. If the challenges of the vast distances involved in
far-seas operations can be met, a Chinese carrier off the coast of Africa or Latin
America would be a strong symbol of national pride and could also serve as a
goodwill ambassador, whether visiting ports or patrolling the global commons.
Program Prospects and Implications
China’s carrier program was powered to ultimate realization by an overarching
strategic logic and still-evolving national maritime strategy. While nationalism
and bureaucratic interests have played—and will continue to play—important
roles in the trajectory of the program, the push for a Chinese carrier could neither
have been sustained across many decades nor have ultimately triumphed without
the impetus of a larger strategic rationale and the emergence of a coherent maritime strategy. The program’s lengthy gestation and repeated failure to gain traction are attributable to the absence of a strategic imperative before the end of the
Cold War. This growing strategic logic and the emerging operational demands
for a carrier in the twenty-first century correspond to an extension of PLA thinking beyond a Taiwan Strait scenario. When the PRC’s military was narrowly focused on operations against Taiwan, an aircraft carrier did not make much sense.
But its operational value is more evident in other scenarios, including protection
of the South China Sea and beyond the First Island Chain. Moreover, strategic
and operational value increases as the PLAN expands its horizons beyond the
First and Second Island Chains.
More than two years after its commissioning, Liaoning is far from fully operational. It is still without a fighter wing, although numerous practice takeoffs and
landings have occurred. It functions essentially as a training vessel and has yet
to venture outside the First Island Chain. Nevertheless, in China the carrier has
captured the imagination of leaders and ordinary people who have come to view
a PLAN aircraft carrier as the ultimate symbol of full-blown Chinese military
power. A carrier signals China’s desire for global power projection—or at least
extended offshore reach.
While the PLAN is still years away from being able to project and sustain significant naval power—let alone in the form of an aircraft carrier—out of area (i.e.,
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beyond the island chains), Beijing is intent on becoming able to play a greater role
in patrolling SLOCs farther afield. Given China’s dependence on imported energy and the importance it attaches to energy security, a logical priority location
for increased PLAN operational activity will be in the Indian Ocean. Although
China has increased the number of overland routes for oil and gas (witness the
construction of pipelines in recent years from Central Asia, Russia, and Myanmar), the PRC remains reliant on seaborne energy, especially petroleum from
fields in Africa and the Middle East.
Liaoning is a visible symbol of China’s growing naval prowess wherever it
steams and is useful in noncombat missions. But in an era of precision-guided
munitions and enhanced over-the-horizon surveillance and reconnaissance, in
wartime Liaoning becomes vulnerable, a sitting (or more accurately, floating)
duck, especially in any conflict involving a highly capable adversary.
China’s carrier program in and of itself, therefore, does not merit alarm by the
Pentagon. It does not fundamentally transform the balance of military power
in the western Pacific. One or two PLAN aircraft carriers will not be especially
useful in the East China or South China Sea. Of course, carriers will extend the
range of Chinese airpower, and their presence will further complicate an already
complex maritime operating environment in the near seas. This prospect does
signal both China’s unmistakable intent to project military power beyond the
First Island Chain and its aspirations to become a global naval powerhouse. And
yet by the time—decades hence—that China does possess multiple large aircraft
carriers and has become adept at operating them, the carrier itself may have become almost irrelevant in the conduct of naval warfare.29
Perhaps the greatest impact for the U.S. military of one or more Chinese carriers will be more perceptual than operational.30 Indeed, the United States and
other countries in the Asia-Pacific have yet to come fully to grips psychologically
with the arrival of a new, increasingly capable, and active blue-water navy in the
region.
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